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Abstract 
 
Using a Non-Linear Integer Programming (NLIP) model, I examine if wage d ifferences 
between Super talents and  Normal players improve the performance of four teams which 
participate in a tournament, such as in the UEFA Champions League (UCL) group matches. 
With ad-hoc wage d ifferences, the optimal solutions of the model show that higher wage 
equality seems to improve the performance of all teams, irrespectively if the elasticity of 
substitution between Super- and Normal- players is high or low. In addition to that, a U-type 
performance exists in two teams with the highest and  the second high elasticity of 
substitution. With team data from the 2011-12 UCL group matches and from the Italian Serie 
A over 2010-12 seasons, the wage d ispersion has no effect on team performances.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The optimal wage structure of teams has been frequently d iscussed  over the last 
decades. The main hypothesis is whether the compressed  or the d ispersed  wages 
among a team’s players have a stronger impact on the p erformance of the team. As is 
very often in economics, there are at least two schools of thought. Lazear & Rosen 
(1981) argued that the team performance increases if the best talents are paid  higher 
wages than the normal players.  Milgrom (1988) and  Lazear (1989) on the other hand, 
stressed  the possibility of bad  field  cooperation between players, and  consequently 
the performance could  be inferior, if the under-paid  players feel d iscriminated . 
Levine (1991) took an extreme position and  favoured  the egalitarian wages. Fehr and  
Schmidt (1999) tried  to balance these two effects and  argued that, as a whole, the 
team losses more if wages are more unequal than equal.  
 
Franck & Nüesch (2007) reviewed the empirical studies from sport teams, in baseball, 
hockey, basket and  football. Some studies seem to support the compressed  wages 
hypothesis. They argue that these findings can partly be explained  because the 
majority of empirical studies assume a linear relationship between wage d ispersion 
and  team performance. In their own study, based  on 5281 individual salary proxies 
from German soccer players between 1995-07, they allowed for squares of the Gini 
coefficient and  the coefficient of variation of the wage d istribution a t the beginning of 
the season. They found a U-formed sportive success, i.e. teams perform better by 
either an egalitarian pay structure or a steep one
1
. On the other hand, Pokorny (2004) 
found an inverted  U-formed success, i.e. the performance is higher with intermediate 
wage d ifferences. Avrutin & Sommers (2007), using baseball data from 2001-05, 
found no effect. Torgler et al (2008), using also data from the German Bundesliga 
(and  the NBA), found  that p layers care more about the salary d istribution within the 
team and not just about their own salary. Generally, players prefer a reduced  
inequality and  in that case their performance improves. In addition, a detailed 
investigation of the basketball data shows also that when a player moves from a 
relative income advantage to a relative d isadvantage, his performance decreases in a 
statistically significant way. On the other hand, moving from relative income 
d isadvantage to relative advantage has no effects. Wiseman & Chatterjee (2003), 
using baseball data from 1980-02, found a negative effect of wage d ispersion. In a 
similar study recently, i.e. with baseball data from 1985-10, Breunig et al (2012) found  
also a negative effect of wage d ispersion. On the other hand, Simmons & Berri (2011), 
using basket statistics, supported  the Lazear & Rosen  (1981) hypothesis that higher 
wage d ispersion increases team performance.  
 
                                                 
1 Also they found evidence that teams with dispersed wages entertain the public better since the 
number of seasonal dribbling and runs increases significantly! 
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In this paper I formulate and  solve a NLIP model to examine mainly the effects of 
wage d ifferences between Super (S) - and  Normal (N) - players in the performance of 
four teams, which participate in a tournament like the UEFA Champions League 
(UCL) group matches. Using ad -hoc wage d ifferences and  various “team production 
functions”, it is of interest to see if the optimal solutions favour the compressed  or 
the d ispersed  wages hypotheses for all, or some teams. In add ition, two small data 
sets (UCL group matches from 2011-12 and  Italian Serie A from  2010-12 seasons) are 
used  to test the above hypotheses.  
 
2.1 The model 
 
There are four football teams which p lay three home and three away matches in the 
group stage of the UCL tournament. As a whole there are 12 matches and  the 
maximum number of points is 36. The two teams which collect most points are 
qualified  for the next round and the other two are eliminated
2
.  
 
The four participating teams have d ifferent qualities and  consequently d ifferent 
ranking. To d ifferentiate the teams, four d ifferent “team production functions” are 
assumed. I follow Kesenne (2007) and  assume that the formation of the teams 
consists of a certain number of S- and  N-players. The S- and  N-players are 
considered  as being from almost complements, to almost substitu tes. All S-players 
are equally “Super” and  all N -players are equally “Normal”
3
. Teams use their S- and 
N- players in order to “produce” points. The supply of S- and  N-players is unlimited .  
 
Since the value of the marginal product of players can’t be observed  or measured , 
teams have a certain wage structure, from very d ispersed  to very compressed . The 
wages is the policy variable of the model. It is assumed that teams have no other 
fixed  costs (like managers or other facilities); their only variable costs consist of the 
wages they pay to their players. It is also assumed that all teams receive similar 
revenues, either d irectly from UEFA, and/ or from their public, TV-rights and  
sponsors and  the wages they pay can’t be higher than  their revenues. All teams p lay 
a “Cournot” type game and maximize simultaneously their points.  
 
The model is rather general and  can explain, not only the own performance, but the 
effect to the other teams as well, even if they keep their wages unchanged. It can also 
                                                 
2
 The third  team continues in the UEFA Europa League. 
3
 Obviously, there are players who, objectively, belong to one category or the other. Perhaps, most 
players are neither that excellent to be classified  in the first category, n or that “Normal” to be 
classified  in the second  category. In the football world , it is very common that the supporters of a team 
tend  to overvalue their own players and  undervalue the competitor’s players. This is an empirical 
issue, left to supporters, to managers, to journalists or even to those who do research in efficiency 
analysis. 
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show whether the tournament remains balanced  and  whether team s who have more 
S-players can collect more points.  
 
Let P
1
, P
2
, P
3
, P
4
, be the points collected  by the teams; let S
1
, S
2
, S
3
, S
4
, be the number of 
S-players, and  N
1
, N
2
, N
3
, N
4 
the number of N-players the teams use in these matches. 
Let w
1
, w
2
, w
3
, w
4
, be the victories of the teams, d
1
, d
2
, d
3
, d
4
, the draw matches and  l
1
, l
2
, 
l
3
, l
4
, the losses (defeats) of the teams. All these 24 variables are positive integers.  
 
Since all firms aim at maximizing points (simultaneously), their objective function is 
given by (1), under the following constraints.  
 
The key constraints that d ifferentiate teams are the teams’ “production” functions , 
(2a – 2d ). All functions are of Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) type of degree 
one, with d ifferent elasticity. The function of team 1 is closed  to Leontief, i.e. very 
low elasticity of substitution between its S- and  N-players
4
. Team 4 on the other 
hand, has a closed  to Cobb-Douglas “production” function, i.e. almost excellent 
elasticity of substitution, team 2 is close to team 1, while team 3 is close to team 4.  
 
The use of S- and  N-players for each team will be endogenously determined  from the 
optimal solution. When the team formation has been determined , it is assumed that 
the same team will be used  for all six matches, unless the wage structure has 
changed. Teams of course change the composition of their players for tactical 
reasons, such as if they play away against a stronger team or if they play at home 
against a weaker team, or because some of their players might be injured  or punished  
and  are not available for a particular match. The model neglects such possibilities. 
The model also assumes that players who are not used  (because the roster of teams 
consists of more than 11 players), receive zero wages. Notice that, due to the integer 
constraint of players, the composition of the team can remain unchanged, even if the 
wages change. t
i
 is the efficiency parameter and  a
i 
is the d istribution parameter .  
 
Constraints (3a – 3d) restrict the number of team players to 11. In reality, even for top 
and  wealthy teams, the number of S- is often lower than the number of N -players, 
which is given by constraints (4a – 4d). Despite the fact, that such  condition is not 
necessary, it is stated explicitly in order to speed  up the solution of this complex 
model.  
 
As is well known, victories are worth 3 points; draws are worth 1 point and  losses, 
zero points. Thus, the number of points collected  to every team is given by 
constraints (5a – 5d).  
                                                 
4
 In reality, an S-player can substitu te an N -player more easily than the reverse. I assume that the 
elasticity of substitution is unchanged , irrespectively if the S- substitutes the N -player, or if the N - 
substitutes the S-player. 
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Each one of the 12 matches in the group of four teams, ends either with a home team 
victory, ,,
h
jiw with an away team victory, ,,
a
ijw or with a home team draw , ,,
h
jid which is 
obviously equal to the away team draw ,
a
ijd , . But, in order to identify the correct pair 
of teams which play draw at home and/ or draw away, we must separate the home 
team draw from the away team draw, i.e. we need  24 additional constraints  (6a – 7l). 
The first 12 constraints (6a – 6l) relate each pair of teams to home team draw and  the 
remaining 12, (7a – 7l), relate to the away team draw. If for instance ,12,1 
hd (and  
consequently 01,22,1 
ah ww ), from constraints (6a) and  (7a) we are ensured  that 
,11,2 
ad as well. If that match ends with a home or away victory, it implies that 
.01,22,1 
ah dd  Moreover, these constraints do not exclude impossible (non -binary) 
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match results, such as .01,22,1 
ah dd 5 and 01,22,1 
ah ww .25. Therefore we require that 
all possible match resu lts are binary as well.  
 
Obviously, the draws (and  the victories) for each team  is the sum of all possible 
draws (and  victories) against all other teams. Constraints (8a – 8d) ensure that the 
number of draws in constraints is always an integer (and  actually even) number, or 
zero. For instance, when team 1 plays only one match draw, it is .11 d If the draw 
match was a home match against team 2, it must be ,12,1 
hd (from 8a), and  ,11,2 
ad  
(from 8b), as well. In that case, if team 2 does not play another match draw, it must 
be 12 d as well. Of course, if team 2 p lays three draw matches, i.e. ,32 d it implies 
that team 2 must have played draw against the other teams as well. A similar 
interpretation applies for the victory constraints (9a – 9d). 
 
Since each team play six matches, there are 6 possible results from its games, i.e. 
constraints (10a – 10d) are required . Constraints (11a – 11d) show that no team can 
collect more than 18 points. In addition to that, constraint (12) shows that the 
maximum number of points from all matches is 36, composed  with 12 victories (for 
two teams) and  12 defeats for the other two teams.   
 
Finally, constraints (13a – 13d) ensure non-negative profits. The revenue function is 
quadratic in the points collected . All teams pay the same, higher wages to their S-
players, and  the same, lower wages to their N -players. The initial parameters are: 
8
iS
w
 
and  ,8.4
iN
w
 
i.e. the N-players receive only 60% of the S-players’ wages. 
Keeping 8
iS
w , the model is repeated  and  solved  for higher and  lower values of the 
parameter .
iN
w
 
Obviously the wage d ispersion or compression does not influence the 
performance of the own team, but the performances of the other teams too. The non-
negative profits constraints are satisfied  if each team collects at least 6 points. With 
less than 6 points there is no integer value of N - and  S-players to ensure non-negative 
profits.  
 
The model is now complete and  was solved  in Lingo, using Global Solver.  
 
2.2 The Solution 
 
I solved the model 124 times, i.e. 31 times per team, using 31 d ifferent ,
iN
w starting 
from as low as 3.4 up to 6.4, increased  at a range of 0.1. When one team changed its 
,
iN
w all other teams keep their own
iN
w unchanged. When ,4.6
iN
w
 
there is no feasible 
(integer) solution, because the non-negative profits constraint(s) are violated .  
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Table 1 depicts the own effects
5
 on performance and  team composition, where the 
policy variable is
iN
w . Some points from the Table 1 are worth mentioned . 
 
The initial solution, with 8
iS
w  and ,8.4
iN
w  shows that the tournament is 
completely balanced , because each team wins its three home matches and  collects 9 
points. Despite the d ifferences in their “production” functions, all four teams have a 
similar team composition, consisting of 1 S-player and  10 N-players and  each team 
makes a profit of 11.5. 
 
Table 1: Points maximization, subject to non-negative profits 
iN
w  S1 N 1 P1  S2 N 2 P2 2 S3 N 3 P3 3 S4 N 4 P4 4 
3.4 1 10 6 0.55 1 10 6 0.43 3 8 6 0.5 1 10 9 0.78 
3.5 1 10 6 0.5 1 10 9 0.5 1 10 9 0.89 1 10 9 0.74 
3.6 1 10 6 0.34 1 10 6 0.5 1 10 9 0.65 3 8 9 0.01 
3.7 1 10 9 0.5 1 10 6 0.01 3 8 6 0.65 1 10 9 0.28 
3.8 1 10 9 0.66 1 10 6 0.29 2 9 6 0.5 2 9 6 0.5 
3.9 1 10 9 0.66 2 9 6 0.48 1 10 9 0.48 2 9 6 0.65 
4.0 1 10 9 0.5 2 9 6 0.01 3 8 9 0.65 1 10 6 0.01 
4.1 1 10 6 0.37 4 7 9 0.44 5 6 9 0.5 1 10 9 0.45 
4.2 1 10 9 0.37 1 10 6 0.30 1 10 6 0.03 1 10 6 0.4 
4.3 1 10 9 0.5 1 10 6 0.66 1 10 6 0.72 1 10 6 0.5 
4.4 1 10 9 0.5 1 10 9 0.37 1 10 6 0.01 1 10 6 0.61 
4.5 1 10 9 0.02 1 10 6 0.44 5 6 9 0.65 5 6 9 0.5 
4.6 1 10 9 0.5 1 10 6 0.44 1 10 6 0.5 1 10 6 0.5 
4.7 1 10 9 0.66 1 10 9 0.5 4 7 9 0.5 4 7 9 0.65 
4.8 1 10 9 0.34 1 10 9 0.36 1 10 9 0.57 1 10 9 0.67 
4.9 1 10 9 0.66 4 7 9 0.5 1 10 9 0.89 1 10 9 0.74 
5.0 1 10 9 0.5 1 10 9 0.44 1 10 9 0.5 4 7 9 0.65 
5.1 1 10 9 0.34 1 10 9 0.01 1 10 9 0.99 3 8 9 0.8 
5.2 1 10 9 0.66 1 10 9 0.34 2 9 9 0.02 1 10 9 0.03 
5.3 1 10 9 0.5 1 10 9 0.37 1 10 9 0.01 1 10 9 0.62 
5.4 1 10 9 0.5 1 10 9 0.5 2 9 9 0.5 1 10 9 0.01 
5.5 1 10 9 0.5 1 10 9 0.65 1 10 9 0.43 1 10 9 0.5 
5.6 1 10 9 0.5 2 9 9 0.76 1 10 9 0.65 1 10 9 0.78 
5.7 1 10 9 0.66 1 10 9 0.5 2 9 9 0.5 1 10 9 0.03 
5.8 1 10 9 0.5 1 10 9 0.65 1 10 9 0.5 1 10 9 0.68 
5.9 1 10 9 0.5 1 10 9 0.65 1 10 9 0.63 1 10 9 0.02 
6.0 1 10 12 0.5 2 9 10 0.65 1 10 10 0.62 1 10 12 0.5 
6.1 1 10 10 0.21 2 9 12 0.44 1 10 10 0.99 1 10 12 0.99 
6.2 1 10 10 0.55 1 10 10 0.5 2 9 12 0.71 1 10 10 0.72 
6.3 1 10 12 0.44 1 10 12 0.5 1 10 12 0.65 1 10 12 0.21 
6.4 1 10 12 0.11 1 10 12 0.2 1 10 12 0.5 1 10 12 0.5 
                                                 
5
 To save space, I have excluded  the cross effects, i.e. effects on o ther teams. The four add itional Tables 
can be provided  by the author at a request. 
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As expected , team 1 (closed  to Leontief), never changes its team composition and  
uses 1 S- and  10 N-players. On the other hand, it is team 3 that changes its team 
composition more frequent (in 11 out of 31 times) and  not team 4, (closed  to Cobb-
Douglas).  
 
The most striking result is that more S-players do not always increase the 
performance of teams! This is due to two reasons. First, other teams might also play 
with more S-players too. Second  the efficiency
6
 of the teams changes too. For 
instance, when ,7.44 Nw both team 4 and  team 2 use 7 N -players and  all teams 
collect 9 points and  their respective efficiencies are almost similar, .6.38,6.43 24  tt  
When ,0.64 Nw  both teams use 10 N-players, team 4 collects 12 points, while team 2 
collects 7 points, because their new efficiencies are .5.7,5.35 24  tt  Obviously, 
when the performance does not increase, the profits of the teams are reduced  with 
more S-players. And the points collected  per team are not related  to their d istribution 
parameter of players’ a
i
. 
 
Finally, the tournament appears to be frequently balanced . For instance, it is 
completed  balanced  in 23/ 31 cases when team 1 selects wages; it is also completely 
balanced  in 16/ 31 cases when team 2 selects wages, and  in 19/ 31 cases when team 3 
or team 4 select wages. And while in most cases the total number of points selected  
equals to 36, there are some draw matches with a total number of points equal to 35 
(always when 0.6
iN
w ).  
 
2.2.1 The regressions from the optimal solutions 
 
(i) The own effects 
 
In order to find  out how the wage d ispersion influences the performance of the 
teams, I run the following two regression equations, based  on all 124 optimal 
solutions.  
 
2
21
1
)8()8(
)8(
ii
i
NNi
Ni
wwP
wP




. 
 
The right hand side variable is the wage d ifference between the respective fixed
8
iS
w and
iN
w , while the dependant variable is points collected . Negative (positive) 
-estimates imply that the performance of teams improves if the wage equality 
(inequality) between the S- and  N-players increases. Similarly, negative -estimates 
                                                 
6
 Due to space constraints, the efficiency parameters are not presented .  
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and positive -estimates imply a U-type success, i.e. either highly unequal or highly 
equal wages will improve performance.   
 
Table 2a summarizes the regression estimates for every team. Based  on the average 
number of points, team 1 and  4 are qualified . It is clear that in the linear model, all 
teams improve their performances when the wage d ispersion decreases (all -
estimates are strongly negative). Consequently, the findings support the Milgrom 
(1988) and  Lazear (1989) hypothesis.  
 
Table 2a: OLS own estimates 
 Team 1 
47.1
97.8



P  
Team 2 
89.1
39.8



P  
Team 3 
72.1
68.8



P  
Team 4 
80.1
74.8



P  
 12.65** 
(19.24) 
13.6** 
(18.52) 
12.75** 
(15.64) 
12.77** 
(14.16) 
 -1.19** 
(-5.84) 
-1.68** 
(-7.39) 
-1.32** 
(-5.20) 
-1.30** 
(-4.65) 
2R  
0.52 0.64 0.46 0.41 
 12.97** 
(5.44) 
17.25** 
(6.73) 
18.36** 
(6.70) 
21.7** 
(7.88) 
 -1.41 
(-0.87) 
-4.25* 
(-2.43) 
-5.26** 
(-2.82) 
-7.58** 
(-4.04) 
 0.036 
(0.14) 
0.414 
(1.48) 
0.637* 
(2.13) 
1.01** 
(3.38) 
2R  
0.51 0.66 0.52 0.56 
** significant at 0.01 level; * significant at 0.05 level; t -statistics is in p arentheses 
 
Regarding the quadratic function, the U-type success for teams 3 and  4 is not 
rejected , over the relevant range ).4.6,...,4.3(
iN
w  For instance, team 3 will minimize 
its performance and  collect about 7.5 points if it pays ,9.3
3
Nw (i.e. if its N-players 
receive slightly less than 50% of the S-players wages), it will collect about 8.5 points if 
it pays the lowest wage 4.3
3
Nw  and  it will collect about 11.5 points if it pays the 
upper-limit wage .4.6
3
Nw Similarly, team 4 will minimize its selected  points (7.5),  if 
it pays 25.4
4
Nw . 
 
(ii) The cross effects 
In order to find  out the performance effects to the other teams, I run the following 
two regression equations:
  
 
jiwwP
wP
jj
j
NNi
Ni


,)8()8(
)8(
2
21
1


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The estimates are given in Table 2b. In the linear model, the estimates are completely 
consistent with those in Table 2a. A decrease of wage d ispersion in team i reduces the 
performance of team j (all -estimates are strongly positive).  
Table 2b: OLS cross estimates 
 Linear Quadratic 
   2R     2R  
 Effect  on Team 2 
 
 
 
Team 1 
7.19** 
(12.2) 
0.64** 
(3.48) 
0.27 9.08** 
(4.3) 
-0.69 
(-0.5) 
0.22 
(1.14) 
0.27 
Effect  on Team 3 
8.20** 
(27.1) 
0.22* 
(2.32) 
0.13 5.87** 
(5.89) 
1.85** 
(2.74) 
-0.26* 
(-2.43) 
0.26 
Effect  on Team 4 
6.99** 
(14.8) 
0.59** 
(4.1) 
0.34 4.57** 
(2.78) 
2.3* 
(2.05) 
-0.27 
(-1.53) 
0.37 
 Effect  on Team 1 
 
 
 
Team 2 
6.95** 
(13.2) 
0.66** 
(4.05) 
0.34 7.5** 
(3.93) 
0.28 
(0.2) 
0.06 
(0.3) 
0.32 
Effect  on Team 3 
6.87** 
(11.9) 
0.66** 
(3.73) 
0.30 2.61 
(1.37) 
3.66** 
(2.81) 
-0.48* 
(-2.32) 
0.39 
Effect  on Team 4 
7.60** 
(9.95) 
0.62* 
(2.60) 
0.16 5.14 
(1.88) 
2.35 
(1.27) 
-0.28 
(-0.94) 
0.16 
 Effect  on Team 1 
 
 
 
Team 3 
6.83** 
(9.21) 
0.85** 
(3.69) 
0.30 5.88* 
(2.20) 
1.51 
(0.83) 
-0.11 
(-0.37) 
0.27 
Effect  on Team 2 
8.15** 
(27.3) 
0.23* 
(2.53) 
0.15 5.24** 
(5.72) 
2.28** 
(3.66) 
-0.33** 
(-3.3) 
0.37 
Effect  on Team 4 
7.3** 
(14.3) 
0.49** 
(3.13) 
0.23 3.0 
(1.82) 
3.52** 
(3.13) 
-0.49* 
(-2.7) 
0.37 
 Effect  on Team 1 
 
 
 
Team 4 
7.91** 
(17.5) 
0.34* 
(2.45) 
0.14 6.59** 
(4.08) 
1.27 
(1.16) 
-0.15 
(-0.8) 
0.14 
Effect  on Team 2 
7.57** 
(11.0) 
0.49* 
(2.30) 
0.13 1.37 
(0.63) 
4.86** 
(3.28) 
-0.7** 
(-2.97) 
0.31 
Effect  on Team 3 
6.78** 
(10.3) 
0.73** 
(3.56) 
0.28 2.84 
(1.26) 
3.5* 
(2.28) 
-0.45 
(-1.82) 
0.33 
 
In the quadratic model, some estimates are consistent with those in Table 2a, because 
a reversed  U-type success appears. For instance, when team 3 pays ,4.6
3
Nw  while 
team 2 keeps its initial wages at ,8.4
2
Nw team 2 collects about 8 points, while team 3 
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would  collect 11.5 points. The pair of teams (first entry denotes wage d ispersion of 
team i and  second entry denotes the performance of team j) with a reversed  U-type 
performance are: (1, 3), (2, 3), (3, 2), (3, 4) and  (4, 3), while in the remaining seven 
pairs, there is no effect. Notice that team 3, which improves its own performance by 
low or high wage d ispersion (Table 2a), is affected  negatively by all other teams too. 
To summarize the estimates, we conclude that team 1 (with the almost Leontief type), 
which collects the highest average number of points (8.97), improves its own 
performance linearly with lower wage d ispersion. And despite the fact that the U-
formed wage d ispersion does not improve its own performance, it is the only team 
that is not influenced  from low or high wage d ispersions of other teams. 
 
3. Empirical study 
 
Obviously, to test the same hypotheses with real data is almost impossible, because 
there are many problems with the observed  players’ wages and  of course the team 
formation.  It will require a huge amount of time to refine all available data set by 
observing each individual player , to examine if he was injured  or punished  and  
unavailable for some matches, or if he played  only a small part in a match. And  even 
if such information were relatively easy to collect, the wage d ispersion of the team 
would  vary depending upon the various weights one uses for each player 
participation in the matches. To ad  hoc exclude some players (often the youngsters 
with low wages) might be erroneous too, because sometimes managers do not play 
the “expensive” players and  deliberately use “cheap” players in some matches.  
 
Two very small data sets have been collected , assuming simply that all players, for 
whom wage observations exist, are available to play , and  all players’ wages have the 
same weights, irrespectively if they played  or not. The team spirit or the envy of 
players exists for the entire team roster and  not necessarily for those players who are 
fielded . The first data set consists of 32 European teams (496 players) from 48 UCL 
group matches, played  in 2011. The aggregate statistics are shown in Appendix 
(Table A). As is shown, for some teams there are accurate observations for at most 
10-13 players. The second data set consists of 40 Italian teams from the Serie A (about 
1015 players), over two seasons 2010-11/ 2011-12, obtained  from the following sites: 
http:/ / www.football-marketing.com/ 2010/ 09/ 07/ italian-serie-a-wage-list/ , 
http:/ / www.xtratime.org/ forum/ showthread .php?t=261972. Notice that 34 of these 
Italian teams appear in both seasons, while the remaining 6 teams appear only in one 
season (3 of them relegated  in the first season and  3 of them advanced  in the second 
season). Since the team roster of these 34 teams change and/ or some wage contracts 
are re-negotiated , the wage d ispersion within the same team varies from year to year.  
 
12 
 
Table 3 summarizes the OLS estimates for these data sets. In UCL, the wage 
d ispersion is measured  by Coefficient of Variation (CV) and  by Mean Absolute 
Deviation (MAD) as well; as control variables, two d ifferent proxies are used , the 
team value (V) and  the respective UEFA ranking (R); in Serie A, the wage d ispersion 
is also measured  by CV and by Coefficient of Dispersion (CD) while as a control 
variable the average wage (W) per team is used .  
 
In case (i), the number of points does not automatically reflect qualification or 
elimination from the tournament, because it depends on the group. For instance in 
group D, the eliminated  third  team’s points (Ajax) are identical to the second team’s 
(Lyon), but Lyon had  a better goal d ifference against Ajax. Similarly, while 
Manchester City eliminated  with 10 points, four other teams in other groups 
qualified  with less points. Consequently, in case (ii), a dummy variable was 
introduced  with the following values: 1 for the two qualified  teams per group; 0.5 for 
the third  eliminated  team and 0 for the fourth team.  
 
Table 3: OLS estimates for UCL and  Serie A 
UCL: (i) Points 
   2R     2R  
 MAD V   CV  V  
4.205** 
(4.50) 
1.775 
(0.78) 
0.014 
(1.89) 
0.45 4.66** 
(2.61) 
-0.45 
(-0.09) 
0.02** 
(4.91) 
0.44 
 MAD R   CV  R  
3.066** 
(2.66) 
3.056 
(1.93) 
0.044* 
(2.16) 
0.47 2.14 
(1.12) 
2.865 
(0.6) 
0.07** 
(4.60) 
0.41 
UCL: (ii) (Dummy)*(Points) 
 MAD V   CV  V  
2.24 
(1.79) 
4.37 
(1.45) 
0.008 
(0.75) 
0.35 1.72 
(0.74) 
2.76 
(0.42) 
0.02** 
(3.61) 
0.30 
 MAD R   CV  R  
0.64 
(0.43) 
3.52 
(1.73) 
0.051 
(1.95) 
0.41 -1.13  
(-0.47) 
5.55 
(0.92) 
0.08** 
(4.17) 
0.37 
Italian Serie A: Points 
 CD W   CV  W  
42.73** 
(6.81) 
-0.08 
(-0.68) 
14.34** 
(5.99) 
0.50 43.49** 
(6.49) 
-0.08 
(-0.62) 
14.44** 
(6.01) 
0.50 
** significant at 0.01 level; * significant at 0.05 level; t -statistics is in parentheses. 
 
Both data sets show similar estimates, with rather low explanatory power. None of 
the d ispersion variables is statistically significant from zero. On the other hand, as 
expected , stronger or richer teams perform bet ter. Moreover, since both samples are 
very small and  the players’ statistics are not refined , it is d ifficult to draw certain 
conclusions. 
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4. Conclusions  
 
The purpose of this paper was to develop a kind  of “general equilibrium” model to 
investigate if teams perform better or worse when they pay rather compressed  or 
more d ispersed  wages to their S- and  N- quality players. In the model, four d ifferent 
football teams compete, in a tournament like the UCL group matches, to maximize 
their points and  qualify in the next ground. Some key features of the model are the 
non-linearity of “production” functions (which are of CES type  with d ifferent 
elasticity of substitution among players) and  a number of various integer variables 
(like players, points, victories and  draws). Assuming a high wage level for the 
implicitly solved  S-quality players in every team and a rather large range of lower 
wages for the implicitly solved  N -quality players, global optimal solutions were 
obtained .  
 
In most cases, the team formation is composed  by 1 S- and  10 N-players. Moreover, 
as it often happens in football, teams which field  more S- players do not always 
perform better than teams with just 1 S-player! This is mainly due to d ifferences in 
absolute and/ or relative efficiency the teams. 
 
Despite the fact that all four teams perform almost equally well and  the wage 
parameters lead  to a rather balanced  tournament, team 1, with the lowest elasticity of 
substitution between S- and  N- players, collects on average, slightly more points than 
all others (followed by team 4, with the highest elasticity of substitution).  
 
Using the collected  points from the respective optimal solutions, linear and  quadratic 
regressions were run to examine the wage dispersion on (i) the own effects and  (ii) 
the cross effects. All four teams improve their own performance if the wage 
d ispersion decreases. In most cases, the decrease in wage d ispersion deteriorates the 
performance of other teams as well. In addition, some evidence on the U-type own 
success and  a reverse U-type cross success appears. Consequently, while highly 
depressed  wages improve performances linearly, intermediary wage d ispersion is 
worse than a highly d ispersed  one.  
 
On the other hand, using two small data sets, from the UCL and the Italian Serie A, 
the observed  wage d ispersion from all players of the teams was not statistically 
significant from zero, when other controlled variables (like the ranking or the value 
of teams) were included in the regressions.  
 
The model can be easily extended to catch other important aspects. For instance, 
instead  of maximizing points, subject to non -negative profits, teams can maximize 
profits. One can also increase the “price” parameter of points from 12 to 15, so that 
teams can collect more than 12 points that some global solutions provided .  Another 
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interesting extension can be to allow different teams compositions in d ifferent 
matches, or combine the “production” functions per match, to find  out if the 
“Leontief team” beats or is defeated  by the “Cobb-Douglas team”, at home or away , 
and  try to collect appropriate match data to test the derived  hypothesis. Finally, since 
the selected  CES functions do not let teams use various tactical d ispositions of 
players, it would  be desirable to stress the field  positions of the S- and  N-players. 
That can be similar in spirit to Hirotsu & Wright (2006), who applied  a Nash-Cournot 
game to figure out the win probabilities of the 4-4-2 strategy over the 4-5-1 one.  
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Table A:  MAD, CV, UEFA Ranking, Team value in m. of € and  Points     
Teams per group Observed  
players 
MAD 
(1) 
CV  
(2) 
Rank  
(3) 
Value  
(4) 
Points  
(5) 
FC Bayern 24 1.8196 0.5517 122.507 359.95 13 
Napoli 24 0.4203 0.6453 39.853 194.2 11 
Man. City 16 1.3656 0.3051 61.507 467.0 10 
Villarreal 16 0.2875 0.3647 78.551 142.6 0 
Inter 26 1.3231 0.6479 102.853 246.85 10 
CSKA 16 0.2625 0.2153 80.566 137.3 8 
Trabzonspor 13 0.2793 0.3130 20.115 87.8 7 
Lille 13 0.3562 0.2580 38.802 119.75 6 
Benfica 16 0.2672 0.2189 86.835 168.2 12 
Basel 13 0.2414 0.2704 53.360 48.3 11 
Man. United  16 0.9422 0.3329 141.507 415.0 9 
Otelui Galati 13 0.1402 0.2970 7.764 18.15 0 
Real Madrid  16 1.5078 0.4148 110.551 542.0 18 
Lyon 15 0.9173 0.3394 94.802 152.2 8 
Ajax 13 0.4911 0.3211 57.943 97.35 8 
Dinamo Zagreb 13 0.2734 0.2972 24.774 44.8 0 
Chelsea 16 1.3500 0.3127 122.507 381.0 11 
Bayer Leverkussen 13 0.5609 0.2907 59.403 137.0 10 
Valencia 13 0.3030 0.1755 83.551 180.0 8 
Genk 13 0.2367 0.2882 12.480 47.9 3 
Arsenal 15 0.8089 0.3250 113.507 299.25 11 
Marseille 13 0.5882 0.2520 84.802 140.65 10 
Olympiacos 15 0.3067 0.3118 61.420 81.4 9 
Borussia Dortmund 16 0.6031 0.4752 30.403 179.75 4 
Apoel 13 0.2604 0.3221 33.599 14.95 9 
Zenit 13 0.3172 0.2421 79.066 155.2 9 
Porto 13 0.3976 0.2730 97.835 210.0 8 
Shakhtar 13 0.4391 0.4539 83.894 143.45 5 
Barcelona 16 1.6711 0.3680 151.551 579.0 16 
AC Milan 25 1.2758 0.6483 88.853 266.3 9 
Plzen 13 0.2166 0.3445 14.070 163.0 5 
Bate Borisov 13 0.1112 0.2403 29.641 17.05 2 
Notes: (1) & (2): For the three Italian teams, the annual wages are found in: 
http://www.xtratime.org/forum/showthread.php?t=261972 ; for all other teams, searching 
extensively various sport sites, forums and the teams’ official sites; most values for the following 
teams are uncertain and for the non- Euro teams, estimated with various exchanges rates into €: 
Trabzonspor, Otelui Galati, Dinamo Zagreb, Genk, Apoel, Plzen, Bate Borisov. 
(3): http://kassiesa.home.xs4all.nl/bert/uefa/data/method4/trank2012.html 
(4): http://www.transfermarkt.co.uk/ 
(5): http://www.uefa.com/uefachampionsleague/season=2012/matches/round=2000263/index.html  
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